Belgium
1. Official institutions
- Statbel — national statistical institute: https://statbel.fgov.be
- Myria (Federal Migration Centre) — independent public body; particularly detailed annual report “La migration en chiffres et en droits”
- CGRA/CGVS (Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons) — asylum statistics
2. Key datasets
- Statbel: population by nationality/origin, employment by nationality of origin
- Myria: comprehensive annual report, reference source for Belgium
- CGRA: detailed asylum statistics by country of origin
3. Demographics
3.1 Current population composition
- As of January 1, 2026, Belgium’s population breaks down as follows: 63.4% Belgians of Belgian origin, 22.8% Belgians of foreign origin, and 13.8% non-Belgians.
- Trend: the share of Belgians of Belgian origin has declined steadily — 78.5% in 2006, 70.7% in 2016, 63.4% in 2026.
- Total population (January 1, 2024): 11,763,650, up 66,093 (+0.57%) over twelve months. Growth components (2023): a negative natural balance of -1,057 (110,198 births vs. 111,255 deaths) offset by a positive net international migration balance of +66,349. Ukrainian nationals accounted for 7.0% of immigration in 2023 (13,702 people), sharply down from 24.6% the previous year.
- Source: Statbel, “Diversité selon l’origine en Belgique” — https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/structure-de-la-population/origine; Statbel, “La Belgique comptait 11 763 650 habitants au 1er janvier 2024” — https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/nouvelles/la-belgique-comptait-11763650-habitants-au-1er-janvier-2024
3.2 Origin breakdown by region
- Composition by origin varies sharply by region (January 1, 2026): in Flanders, 71.1% are of Belgian origin, 17.8% Belgians of foreign origin, and about 11% non-Belgian; in Wallonia, 63.1% / 25.8% / about 11%; in the Brussels-Capital Region, only 21.5% of Belgian origin, against 41.8% Belgians of foreign origin and 36.7% non-Belgian.
- Legal immigration by reason (first residence permits, 2023): more than 40,000 immigrants obtained a first residence permit for family reasons, of whom 60% were third-country nationals (mainly Morocco, India, Syria) and 40% EU citizens (mainly Romania, Spain, Netherlands).
- International protection (asylum) applications in 2024: 39,615 applications filed with the Immigration Office, up 11.6% from 2023 (35,507). Main countries of origin: Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Turkey. Protection rate on CGRA final decisions in 2024: 47.2% (45.3% refugee status, 1.9% subsidiary protection).
- Source: Statbel, “Diversité selon l’origine en Belgique” — https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/structure-de-la-population/origine; Myria, “La migration en chiffres et en droits 2025” — https://www.myria.be/fr/publications/la-migration-en-chiffres-et-en-droits-2025-le-rapport-annuel-de-myria; CGRA/CGVS, “Statistiques décembre : bilan 2024” — https://www.cgra.be/fr/actualite/statistiques-decembre-bilan-2024
3.3 Immigration waves (1946 – present)
- 1946–1956: a bilateral agreement signed with Italy in 1946 brings around 50,000 Italian workers to Belgium, mainly into coal mining. The Marcinelle mining disaster of August 8, 1956 (262 dead, mostly Italian workers) leads Italy to suspend labor emigration to Belgium.
- 1964–1974: bilateral labor agreements with Morocco and Turkey (1964) initiate a new wave of labor immigration; Moroccan and Turkish nationals become the main non-European-origin national groups in Belgium.
- 1974: Belgium tightens immigration policy and moves to “zero immigration,” closing its borders to new labor migration. Family reunification, however, remains legally permitted, enabling the durable settlement of Moroccan and Turkish communities. From the 1980s onward, Moroccan and Turkish immigration arrives mainly through family reunification rather than labor contracts.
- 2004–2007 / EU enlargement: growing labor migration from new EU member states (notably Romania, Poland).
- 2015–2016: European asylum crisis, with elevated application numbers from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
- 2022 – present: Ukrainian arrivals under temporary protection following Russia’s invasion; their share of total immigration fell sharply from 24.6% (2022) to 7.0% (2023) as the initial wave subsided. 2024 asylum applications rose again to 39,615, driven mainly by Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Turkey.
- Sources: CIRÉ asbl, “Les 4 phases de la politique migratoire” — https://www.cire.be/les-4-phases-de-la-politique-migratoire/; CIRÉ asbl, “50 ans d’immigration marocaine et turque” — https://www.cire.be/50-ans-d-immigration-marocaine-et-turque-toute-une-histoire/; Statbel and CGRA/CGVS sources cited above.
3.4 Age structure by origin
- Belgians of Belgian origin
- Belgians of foreign origin
- Non-Belgians
- The share of Belgians of Belgian origin rises clearly with age: 50.8% among 0–17-year-olds, 60.2% among 18–64-year-olds, and 84.5% among those 65 and older. Conversely, both Belgians of foreign origin and non-Belgians are concentrated in younger age bands. Note: Statbel’s source publishes the Belgian-origin and non-Belgian shares directly for each age band; the “Belgians of foreign origin” share shown above is obtained by subtraction (the three shares sum to 100% within each band), as stated explicitly in the source commentary.
- Source: Statbel, “Diversité selon l’origine en Belgique” — https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/structure-de-la-population/origine
3.5 Long-term projection
4. Public finances — net cost
Two methodologies with diverging results have been identified for Belgium; no complete budgetary study from the Itinera Institute was found (the institute publishes qualitative analyses on immigration and demographic aging, but no detailed, verifiable net fiscal calculation).
| Method | Result | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Comparison of social contributions paid versus social benefits received, by generation and origin (EU/non-EU), 2014–2019 data | GDP impact of recent migration flows: +3.5% over five years (+0.7% per capita); first-generation immigrants contribute less than the Belgian average, second-generation immigrants contribute more than the Belgian average — figures could not be re-verified during this update (source PDF not automatically extractable); to be confirmed by manual consultation before final publication | National Bank of Belgium (commissioning body: public institution), C. Piton, A. Baeyens, D. Cornille, P. Delhez, L. Van Meensel, L’impact économique de l’immigration en Belgique, Economic Review, November 2020 (https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/economicreview/2020/ecorev2020_special_digest_fr.pdf) |
| Macroeconomic calculation of net contribution to public finances as % of GDP, standard OECD methodology | Net contribution of immigrants to Belgian public finances estimated at 0.75% of GDP, approximately €3 billion (positive direction) | OECD, International Migration Outlook (commissioning body: intergovernmental organization); figure reported and summarized by the Belgian press based on OECD publications — direct access to the Belgium country note was not confirmed by reading the OECD primary source (https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/economic-impact-of-migration.html) |
- A contrary estimate of €8.6 billion in annual net cost (€5,696 per European foreign national, €10,115 per non-European foreign national) has circulated publicly (origin: Institut pour la Démocratie Directe en Europe, IDDE) and was deemed erroneous by a journalistic fact-check, which established that the 2.2% figure cited by some political officials actually corresponded, in the NBB study itself, to a rise in the level of public spending over five years (not 2.2% of GDP per year). No publicly available data to directly verify the IDDE study against an identified primary institutional or academic source.
4.1 Pension system / dependency ratio
5. Labor market
- Belgian origin
- EU candidate countries
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- North Africa
- Overall employment rate (20–64-year-olds) rose from 64.7% in 2003 to 71.9% in 2022. The 2022 breakdown by origin: 75.8% for people of Belgian origin, 70.9% for EU14 nationals (excluding Belgium), 76.4% for EU13 nationals — Statbel’s publication does not provide a simple EU27/non-EU27 aggregate but a finer breakdown by area of origin.
- Over 2003–2022, all origin categories improved: people of North African origin rose from 40.5% to 51.3% (+27% relative); Sub-Saharan African origin from 43.0% to 54.3% (+26% relative); EU candidate countries from 38.6% to 58.2% (+51% relative). Gaps of around 20 to 24 points versus the population of Belgian origin persisted in 2022, despite the improvement for every group.
- Source: Statbel, “Situation sur le marché du travail selon la nationalité d’origine” (June 13, 2023, data through 2022) — https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/nouvelles/situation-sur-le-marche-du-travail-selon-la-nationalite-dorigine
6. Security / justice
- A national, freely accessible aggregate statistic cross-tabulating recorded offenses with nationality of alleged offenders was not identified during this research; the Federal Justice Department and the Federal Police do not appear to publish this in a directly usable public form.
7. Education
- PISA 2022 survey (Wallonia-Brussels Federation): the sample size (2,913 students born in 2006, 103 French-speaking schools) is confirmed by direct reading of the source. The Federation is described as among the education systems with the widest socioeconomic achievement gap, slightly wider than in 2018, and the immigrant/native achievement gap is also described as rising since 2018 — without precise point values being confirmed in the text consulted. Source: OECD/PISA 2022, results reported by the Wallonia-Brussels Federation — https://www.uliege.be/cms/c_19196136/en/pisa-2022-les-resultats-des-eleves-de-la-federation-wallonie-bruxelles
8. Housing
- Statbel publishes tenure-status data (owner/tenant) by year of construction, dwelling type, and region, but no breakdown by nationality or migration background was found in the Census 2021 publications consulted. Source consulted: Statbel, “Régime de propriété” — https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/census/housing/type-ownership
9. Social cohesion
10. Recent political context
- Asylum reception crisis (since 2020–2022): persistent saturation of the Fedasil reception network, leaving many international protection applicants unaccommodated despite their legal right to reception. The French-speaking labor tribunal of Brussels issued a statement on May 24, 2022, warning of a surge in reception-related litigation, normally limited to a few dozen cases per year. Source: French-speaking labor tribunal of Brussels, “Actualité” — https://www.tribunaux-rechtbanken.be/fr/tribunal-du-travail-francophone-de-bruxelles/news/902
- Ruling of January 21, 2022: the French-speaking court of first instance of Brussels ordered the Belgian State and Fedasil to pay a penalty of €5,000 per business day for each instance in which a person seeking to file an asylum application is prevented from doing so, and a separate €5,000-per-day penalty if an asylum seeker is denied reception (capped at €100,000 per defendant). A subsequent order (July 22, 2022) set a penalty of €1,000 per night spent outside the reception network for a specific applicant. Source: legal analysis by the Centre Perelman (ULB) — https://centreperelman.be/de-camara-et-m-v-c-belgique-a-la-declaration-de-chisinau-la-non-execution-systematique-des-decisions-judiciaires-en-matiere-daccueil-quelles-perspectives-pour-les-droits-des-personnes/
- Non-enforcement of rulings: according to the same analysis, the Brussels labor tribunal ordered Fedasil more than 7,000 times in total to provide reception for asylum seekers, but the agency reportedly enforced only a minority of these rulings once final, leaving people without accommodation. Source: Centre Perelman (ULB), same publication.
11. Data limitations and biases
⚠️ Limits Belgian federalism fragments certain competences (education, integration) between Communities (Flemish, French, German-speaking) and Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels); the PISA 2022 data found, for example, cover only the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, with no consolidated national-level equivalent identified during this research. Several official PDF documents (Myria, Federal Justice Department) proved difficult to process via automated extraction (encoded/compressed content), which limited direct access to certain figures despite their apparent public availability. Statbel does not appear to publish a systematic breakdown cross-tabulating nationality/origin with housing or with employment rate by region, which limits subnational comparisons that would otherwise be relevant in Belgium. Figures on the net fiscal cost of immigration are sensitive to methodology (contributions/benefits comparison versus macroeconomic modeling as % of GDP) and to the reference period; contested figures (e.g., €8.6 billion) circulate publicly without a clearly identified and verifiable primary institutional or academic source.