Net Fiscal Impact of Immigration — 20-Country Official Data Comparison
This page compiles official estimates of the net fiscal cost or contribution of immigration published by national governments, central banks, and international organizations. Methodologies, population scopes, and time horizons differ significantly between countries — direct number-to-number comparisons require caution. "No official data available" means no official estimate was found at the time of research, not an omission by this site.
Very few countries conduct systematic, repeated fiscal accounting in the manner of Denmark's Finance Ministry. Most have only one-off studies, partial estimates, or research institution analyses. This is a structural limitation of international comparison.
Fiscal Cost / Contribution: Country-by-Country Official Data
| Country | Estimated Cost / Contribution | Source Institution | Population Covered | Year / Period | Detail page |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | −DKK 16bn/year | Finance Ministry (Finansministeriet) | All immigrants & descendants (non-Western: −DKK 27bn; Western: +DKK 11bn) | 2019 data (revised Sep 2023) | |
| Sweden | +SEK 6bn/year (net cost) | Konjunkturinstitutet (National Institute of Economic Research) | All foreign-born | 2022 data | |
| Norway | +NOK 4.1m/person (Group R3) | SSB (Holmøy & Strøm, commissioned by Finance Ministry / NOU 2017:2) | Net present value cost per immigrant. R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia): net fiscal contribution (negative cost) | 2015 additional immigrants, 2015–2100 projection | |
| Finland | No official data available | VATT (study in progress) | Research launched Feb 2025, results expected H1 2027 | Not yet published | |
| Germany | −€2.1bn/year (average) | DIW Berlin / IAB (commissioned by Federal Ministry of Labour BMAS) | 2015 refugee cohort, average through 2030. IW Köln estimate: −€2.8bn/year | 2017 study (2030 projection) | |
| Netherlands | Cumulative ~€400bn (1995–2019) | van de Beek et al. (using CBS microdata; partial Renaissance Instituut funding) | Lifetime fiscal present value. Asylum & family reunification: strongly negative. Labour & study immigration from Western countries: positive | 1995–2019 cumulative (2021 study) | |
| Belgium | +~€3bn (GDP +0.75%) | OECD (International Migration Outlook) | All immigrants. Separate NBB estimate: GDP +3.5% over 5 years | Reference year unspecified (OECD estimate) | |
| France | No official data available | — | No regular official accounting equivalent to Denmark's model. Legal restriction on ethnic origin statistics | — | |
| United Kingdom | Method-dependent (±) | CReAM (UCL) / OBR / Oxford Economics | EU migrants 2001–2011: +£22.1bn net (static). Non-EEA migrants: near neutral to slightly positive. OBR: immigrant arriving at 25 contributes +£341,000 over lifetime | 2014 / 2018 / 2025 studies | |
| Ireland | Net fiscal contribution (qualitative) | ESRI (commissioned by Dept. of Justice & Migration) | Over past 20 years, foreign-born residents contributed more on average than Irish-born (no aggregate euro figure) | June 2026 | |
| Austria | All migration forms combined: +€1.4bn (cumulative) Post-2015 asylum migrants: −€8.1bn | EcoAustria (commissioned by ÖIF) | All migration forms vs. post-2015 asylum sub-group. PuMA macro general equilibrium model | Cumulative through 2020 | |
| Italy | +€1.2bn/year | Fondazione Leone Moressa (independent research foundation) | Foreign national residents' taxes + social contributions minus social spending. 4.6m foreign taxpayers paid €10.1bn income tax (2023) | 2024 annual report | |
| Spain | +0.4 to +0.7 pp/year (per capita GDP) | Bank of Spain (Banco de España) | Direct contribution of foreign nationals to per capita GDP growth. Not a net fiscal balance — GDP growth attribution | 2022–2024 | |
| Portugal | 17.5% of social security revenue | AIMA (Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum) | Immigrants' share of total social security contributions (~€2.2bn). Zero-immigration scenario: fiscal burden rises by ~2.8pp of GDP | 2024 | |
| Czechia | Ukraine TPS only: revenue CZK 8.2bn vs. expenditure CZK 3.9bn (quarterly) | Ministry of Labour (MPSV) model calculation | Partial estimate for Ukrainian temporary protection beneficiaries only. Not a full cost-benefit analysis | 2025 Q3 estimate | |
| Switzerland | No official data available | — | No confirmed OFS/SECO official per-immigrant net cost accounting. GDP and productivity impact analyses exist | — | |
| United States | Federal deficit reduction ~$900bn (cumulative) | CBO (Congressional Budget Office, non-partisan) | Effect of 2021–2026 immigration surge on federal finances (2024–2034 cumulative). Additional revenue: ~$1.2tr; mandatory spending increase: ~$177bn. Federal level only | July 2024 CBO report | |
| Canada | No official data available | — | No systematic official accounting equivalent to Denmark's model. Fraser Institute (private) estimate: ~CAD 6,051/immigrant/year net cost (methodology disputed by academics) | — | |
| Australia | Skilled migrants: largest positive net effect Humanitarian migrants: smallest positive net effect | Australian Treasury / Centre for Population | Lifetime fiscal impact of permanent migration program. By visa category: skilled > family > humanitarian. Age at arrival is primary determinant | December 2021 report | |
| New Zealand | No official data available | — | No confirmed aggregate fiscal cost/contribution study. Productivity Commission (2022): immigration has neutral impact on productivity | — |
Important Caveats for Comparison
- Static vs. dynamic accounting: Annual tax-minus-spending approaches (static) and lifetime present value approaches (dynamic) produce very different results. Denmark and Australia use dynamic/lifetime approaches.
- Population scope: Some countries cover all immigrants; others cover only specific cohorts (refugees, recent arrivals) or visa categories.
- Government level: The US CBO estimate is federal only and excludes state/local costs. Australia explicitly notes that fiscal benefits accrue federally while infrastructure costs fall on states.
- Commissioning body: Studies commissioned by government ministries, employer associations, and private foundations may differ in assumptions and emphasis. Funding sources are noted in each country page.